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Abstract - New-Keynesian macroeconomic models typically conclude that longrun unemployment 
gravitates around the NAIRU, regardless of the nominal inflation rate. Contrastingly, the model of 
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) (ADP) predicts that excessively low inflation may result in a 
situation where unemployment is high relative to the social optimum. This paper investigates 
whether ADP-type short- and long-run Phillips Curves may suit the Italian economy. Firstly we 
estimated a short-run non accelerationist Phillips curve (i.e. where the expected inflation coefficient 
depends on inflation and it is generally less than unit) on Italian post-war data. Based on these 
results, we then simulated the long-run Phillips Curve and ran robustness checks by using a rival 
cointegration approach. We have two main results. First, the Italian short-run Phillips curve is 
actually non-accelerationist. Second, our estimates indicate that in Italy a long-run trade-o¤ 
between inflation and unemployment cannot be ruled out at low and moderate inflation rates.  
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 1 Introduction
The existing debate about the long-run Phillips Curve is essentially a debate
about money non-neutrality. Macroeconomic theorists have always had great
di¢ culties in admitting the existence of long-run money non-neutrality to core
macroeconomics theory, even though the data generally suggest that monetary
shocks leave a permanent scar on real variables (Mankiw, 2001). Here we want
to show that such scars can be found also in Italian data.
In this work, we ￿rst perform a simple quantitative exercise: we estimate
the model of Akerlof, Dickens, Perry (2000) (henceforth ADP) with Italian data,
presenting our evidence for a short-run non-accelerationist Phillips Curve. As a
further step and following Wyplosz (2001), we adopt a rival methodology to as-
sess the presence of nonlinearities in the Italian long-run Phillips curve. Finally
we compare the results of the two approaches and we draw our conclusions.
ADP￿ s (2000) model assumes that as long as in￿ ation is low, ￿rms ignore or
underweight in￿ ation in setting e¢ ciency wages. Furthermore, their Near Ratio-
nal inattentiveness does not vanish in time but fades only with rising in￿ ation.
Near Rationality1 of their behavior implies that even though the individual
losses implied by this kind of behavior are only second order, the aggregate con-
sequences are extremely relevant.The model has two main implications. First,
the combination of near rational behavior and e¢ ciency wages, results in a non-
accelerationist short-run Phillips Curve, i.e. a Phillips Curve where the expected
in￿ ation coe¢ cient is generally less than unity and it depends on in￿ ation. Sec-
ond, the long-run Phillips Curve is non vertical and becomes backward-bending
at an intermediate in￿ ation rate.
From the theoretical standpoint, many authors have come up with models
challenging the standard NAIRU framework and obtaining a result of long-
run money non-neutrality. As a consequence, in these models monetary policy
can determine not only the volatility of real output and employment, but also
their long-run time paths. According to Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2007) this
literature can be divided in two main strands: path dependency models and
market imperfections models. The former comprehends Demand Led Growth
models (Setter￿eld, 1999, 2002; Le￿n-Ledesma and Thirlwall, 2002; McCombie
et al., 2002), Hysteresis models (Blanchard et al., 1986; Franz, 1987; Ball, 1999)
and Multiple Equilibria models (De Long and Summers, 1988; Diamond, 1982;
Weitzman, 1982). The latter focuses on inserting some kind of rigidity in the
functioning of the labor market, and it comprehends ADP￿ s (2000) model among
others.
There is a clear consensus on the fact that it is mainly nominal and real
downward wage rigidities which cause monetary policy to a⁄ect the labor mar-
ket performance, at least in the short-run. Nominal wage rigidities generally
arise from resistance to nominal wage cuts. This resistance can be motivated
by money illusion, fairness considerations, nominal minimum wages or nominal
1￿Near rational behaviour is behaviour that is perhaps suboptimal but nevertheless imposes
very small individual losses on its practitioners relative to the consequences of their ￿rst best
policy￿(Akerlof and Yellen, 1985b, p.825).
1contracts (Keynes 1936; Slichter and Luedicke 1957; Tobin 1972; Akerlof, Dick-
ens and Perry 1996 and 2000). Real wage rigidities have three main sources: real
wage cuts can by prevented by e¢ ciency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), by
wage indexation (Gray, 1976; Fisher, 1977a), and by union bargaining (Holden,
1997 and 2004). Empirical studies show that the third source may be the main
responsible for the cronically high unemployment rates in EU countries .
Under low in￿ ation, such rigidity means that more workers than needed
maintain their wage unchanged and fewer workers than needed experience wage
cuts. This implies higher unemployment and some more in￿ ation could facilitate
real wage adjustments ("greasing the wheels" of the market) with consequent
bene￿ts in employment and output: this is what the literature calls grease ef-
fect2 of in￿ ation. On the other hand, there is also the sand e⁄ect of in￿ ation,
which refers to in￿ ation a⁄ecting real price and wage adjustments in response
to nominal shocks, hence misdirecting resources and lowering output below the
potential. When in￿ ation is low grease e⁄ects should prevail, while at higher
rates sand e⁄ects are supposed to dominate. This means that on the side of
in￿ ation-unemployment dynamics, grease and sand e⁄ects could be responsible
for nonlinearities in the PC. In this case, higher in￿ ation does not ameliorate the
problems associated with downward rigidity. Only higher productivity growth,
by providing scope for higher growth in real wages, can reduce the unemploy-
ment caused by a real wage ￿ oor.
There are a number of studies suggesting that the long-run Phillips curve
may not be vertical also in the empirical literature. In particular, several stud-
ies have tested the presence of nonlinearities in the Phillips curve, due to the
grease and sand e⁄ects we referred above. To this purpose, evidence regarding
European countries is provided by Groshen and Schweitzer (1997). Previously
Bullard and Keating (1995) found a negative long-run response of output to a
reduction in in￿ ation in countries with low in￿ ation. In the US, studies by King
and Watson (1994) and Fair (2000) also suggest a long-run unemployment-
in￿ ation trade-o⁄. Furthermore, evidence from ADP (1996) and (2000), and
ADP and Fortin (2002), indicates that both American and Canadian data reject
the traditional natural rate hypothesis against that of nonlinearity. However,
attempts to apply the ADP model outside the United States and Canada are
few and far from being exhaustive. The most in-depth study belongs to Lund-
borg and SacklØn (2003, 2006) and it regards the Swedish economy. In addition
also Wysploz (2001) and Dickens (2001, commenting on Wysploz) proposed
some preliminary estimates concerning France, Germany, Switzerland and the
Netherlands. The point is that these studies produced some robust results only
when applied to countries with centralized wage setting and with a tradition of
low in￿ ation, like Sweden and Germany.
This article aims at ￿lling this research gap, by applying ADP￿ s model to
Italian data and cross-checking the results by using Wysplosz￿ s (2001) atheo-
2The ￿rst who referred to grease and sand e⁄ects of in￿ation , was James Tobin (1978) in
his Presidential address. By contrast Milton Friedman (1977) gave a contrasting interpretation
of such e⁄ects. More recently Groshen and Schweitzer (1996, 1997) gave further contributions
on this issue.
2retical approach. We employed Italian quarterly data for the period 1960-2003
and we undertook the standard empirical procedure proposed by ADP. First,
we estimated a short-run Phillips curve allowing for state-dependent slopes and
intercepts. Second, we computed from the estimated parameters the numerical
values for the long-run nonlinear Phillips curve and its key indicators. However,
the literature has contested the validity of this procedure since long-run behav-
ior and short-run deviations should theoretically be captured by a cointegration
relationship. For this reason we also checked the robustness of our results fol-
lowing an approach similar to the one of Wyplosz (2001), with a cointegration
interpretation.
Under the two speci￿cations, we obtain reasonably strong evidence that the
Italian short-run Phillips Curve is not accelerationist and that the coe¢ cient on
expected in￿ ation varies with the in￿ ation rate. In particular the state depen-
dent area of our Phillips Curve suggests that at zero in￿ ation at least 10 percent
of price setters are taking in￿ ation fully into account, while it takes extremely
high in￿ ation rates (almost 3-4 % quarterly) to turn all ￿rms into rational ac-
tors. The long-run results are much more puzzling and they probably require
further theoretical and empirical research. However, at this stage the estimates
indicate that in Italy a long-run trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and unemployment
exists. This supports the general result of the literature that the NAIRU model
needs to be revised, especially for European countries where hysteresis e⁄ects
may be very important. Nevertheless our estimate for the Italian lowest sustain-
able rate of in￿ ation of 3-4% quarterly, casts some doubts on the ability of the
model to tell a coherent story about unemployment at high rates of in￿ ation.
We conclude that real wage rigidities as well as other labor market problems
should probably be integrated into this approach in order to obtain a better ￿t
for European data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main
points of ADP￿ s model, deriving both the short-run and the long-run Phillips
Curves. Our methodology to apply ADP￿ s model to Italian post-war data is
described in section 3: the ￿rst part is devoted to ADP-type procedure, while the
second contains the cointegrating system approach, along the lines of Wyplosz
(2001). Section 4 draws some policy implications for Italy within the EU and
o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 The ADP (2000) Model
2.1 price and wage setting behavior
This section is devoted to a discussion of the main theoretical points of ADP￿ s
(2000) model. As explained in the previous section, near rational behavior
towards in￿ ation expectations is supported by robust psychological evidence.
We show that, in ADP￿ s model, if ￿rms and/or workers disregard in￿ ation at
low rates, the aggregate consequences will be relevant from a welfare point
of view: wages will be set at a lower level than they should be with respect
3to nominal demand, and similarly for prices. The general result will be low
unemployment at moderate in￿ ation rates.
ADP assume a continuum of n monopolistically competitive ￿rms, dividing
up total aggregate demand according to the relative price for their respective
good. Aggregate demand is of the simplest form, determined by a quantity




Where Y is real income, M is the money supply and p is the average price












The description of ￿rms￿wage setting behavior is quite simple: they set ef-
￿ciency wages, minimizing unit labor costs. The rationale of this wage setting
policy is that here ￿rms cannot exactly measure workers￿e⁄ort, and thus they
must take into consideration the expected e⁄ort level when minimizing the la-
bor cost per e¢ ciency unit. For each ￿rm the expected productivity or e⁄ort
level will be a concave function of the relative wage, and a positive function of
unemployment:
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with 0 < ￿ < 1 and A;B;C > 0





, i.e. the nominal
wage paid by ￿rm j compared to the reference wage of workers in that ￿rm.
The reference wage gives workers the perception of the wages paid to other
workers in other industries, and thus it represents a benchmark concerning
outside opportunities. In this context, workers￿productivity depends on their
morale, which is assumed to increase as nominal wages increase relative to the
reference wage.
Once again the reference wage perceived by workers is not exactly measurable
by the ￿rm, which has to guess it following a simple rule of thumb. Rational
￿rms (j = r) will set wages for the next period after having projected the e⁄ects
of expected in￿ ation on the reference wage of their workers:
wR
r = w￿1(1 + ￿e) (2)
Where w￿1is given, and represents last period average wage, in the light of
expected in￿ ation. By contrast near rational ￿rms (j = nr) will underweight or
ignore some part of future expected in￿ ation:
wR
nr = w￿1(1 + ￿￿e) (3)
4Where 0 < ￿ < 1 can be seen as the ￿ degree of rationality￿of ￿rms. In
what follows we assume for simplicity that near rational ￿rms ignore in￿ ation
(￿ = 0). It can be shown that the qualitative results of the model do not change
if only a fraction of in￿ ation is incorporated ( 0 < ￿ < 1): The e¢ ciency wages
set by rational and near rational ￿rms will be set minimizing the labor cost per
expected e¢ ciency unit, and they will evidently di⁄er due to the reference wage




























It is easy to see that when the Solow condition is satis￿ed, i.e. the elasticity
of expected e⁄ort with respect to the wage rate equals unity, the optimal wage








j for j = r;nr (4)
The reference wage is therefore lower in the near rational sector. Further-
more, real wages will also be lower in the near rational sector, and employment
will be higher as a result. An interesting property of this model is that al-
though wages set by rational and near rational ￿rms are di⁄erent over time, the
di⁄erence does not accumulate because they are both multiples of wR
j . With
steady in￿ ation, the reference wage will rise for both types of ￿rms but it will
always stand in the ratio z = (1 + ￿￿e=1 + ￿e). As a consequence of this, the
di⁄erence between the expected reference wages in the two sectors will be small
and unimportant at low rates of in￿ ation.
The key element in this model can be found in the optimal e⁄ort level ex-
pected to be supplied by workers of ￿rm type j, which can be found by sub-
stituting either (2) or (3) in (4). A graphical illustration of the supplied e⁄ort
level in equilibrium is very useful in order to fully appreciate its importance.
As shown in ￿gure 1, assuming a moderate rate of in￿ ation, near rational ￿rms
ignore in￿ ation and overestimate productivity, expecting the e⁄ort level e0; for
this reason they think they are positioned at point B and set their wage at
level wnr. In reality, near rational ￿rms will be positioned at point C, where
they get a much lower e⁄ort level, enr. On the contrary, rational ￿rms, which
are not plagued by money illusion, are positioned at point A. They correctly
guess the reference wage of their workers and thus their workers￿productivity.
Paying wage wr they will obtain exactly the expected productivity e0. Near
rational behavior in expectations formation is therefore translated into a failure
to minimize unit labor costs, as the wage wnr satis￿es the Solow condition only
5with respect to expected e⁄ort and not with respect to the actual one. As a
consequence, rational ￿rms will always have slightly higher pro￿ts than near
rational ones: the unit labor cost per e¢ ciency unit at point C (the inverse of
the ratio enr=wnr) will always be greater than the unit labor cost at point A
(the inverse of the ratio er=wr). However, If in￿ ation is below a certain level,
such non-maximizing behavior can remain in place in the long-run, since pro￿t
losses implied by these errors are very small and do not accumulate over time.
-Figure 1 about here-
The pro￿ts for both types of ￿rms ￿j are described by equation (5) while
the pro￿t maximizing price will simply consist in a constant mark up over unit































Now we de￿ne a crucial element for the concept of near rationality, that
is to say the pro￿t loss that near rational ￿rms face as a consequence of their
failure to incorporate expected in￿ ation in workers￿reference wage. We call L





= 1 ￿ z1￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
z￿ ￿ 1 + ￿
￿
(7)
Equation (7) carries two fundamental properties of the model. First, when
in￿ ation is zero,z = 1 and thus near rational behavior produces no losses. More-
over when in￿ ation is near zero, these losses will also continue to be small, as
dL
d￿j￿=0 = 0: By means of equation (7) it is also possible to calculate losses due
to near rational behavior at di⁄erent rates of in￿ ation, and for di⁄erent values
of the structural parameters ￿ and ￿. In their article ADP show that, as long
as yearly in￿ ation is below 5%, the maximum share of pro￿t loss due to near
rational behavior is roughly 3.5%.3
Finally the loss function (7) is useful to calculate the fraction of near rational
price-setters in the economy at a given in￿ ation rate. Psychological studies4
3It was estimated (see Leonard (1987), Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) )that a typical
American ￿rm annually experiences demand shocks that cause it to adjust its size up or down
by 10%, and failing to adjust to such a shock would cost the ￿rm 10% of its pro￿ts. Considering
such a benchmark, ADPconclude that a pro￿t loss of 3.5% seems to be far down in the list of
dangerous things for a typical ￿rm.
4See Shiller (1997) among others.
6show that as long as in￿ ation is below a certain threshold of salience, it is not
perceived as costly to economic agents. As a consequence, ADP assume that
￿rms are willing to tolerate losses only up to a given threshold " before switching
to fully rational behavior. The hypothesis is that there are di⁄erent thresholds,
normally distributed with mean ￿"and standard deviation ￿". Accordingly, for

















Where ￿ is the standard normal cumulative distribution, and it is an in-
creasing function of ￿e, via z = (1 + ￿￿e=1 + ￿e).
2.2 Derivation of the short-run and long-run Phillips Curve
Up to this point the model consists of nine equations, two equations determined









r. In order to close the model
and derive the Phillips curve, we now need an equation for the aggregate price
level p, as a weighted average of prices set in this economy:
p = ￿p￿
r + (1 ￿ ￿)p￿
nr
With the corresponding expressions at t ￿ 1 we obtain the short-run price
Phillips curve as:












Taking logarithms on both sides and making the following approximations:















’ d ￿ cut + g￿ue
t
we ￿nally obtain the following short-run Phillips curve:5
￿t = d ￿ cut + ￿￿e
t + g￿ue
t (9)
Equation (9) is only a slightly modi￿ed form of the standard in￿ ation aug-
mented short-run Phillips curve, the only relevant di⁄erence is that here only a
fraction ￿ of future expected in￿ ation is taken into account. Notice that here
5A slightly di⁄erent form of the short-run Phillips curve is obtained when agents only
underweight in￿ation (￿ 6= 0): ￿t = d￿cut+(1￿f)￿e
t +(1￿f)h￿ue
twhere h = ￿C=B(1￿￿)
and f = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿):
7￿ is not a simple parameter, but it represents the share of rational price setters
in the economy and it varies with the in￿ ation rate. For low or modest in￿ ation
rates, ￿ will be positive but small, as many agents will be ignoring in￿ ation in
price and wage setting. As in￿ ation rises up to the salient level, an increasing
number of ￿rms will become rational: ￿=1 is an asymptote for very high in-
￿ ation rates. Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of equation (9) in the
simpli￿ed case in which d = 0 and ￿ue
t = 0, for di⁄erent levels of the in￿ ation
rate. As expected, the Phillips curve intercept gradually shifts upwards as the
in￿ ation rate increases. At high in￿ ation all expected in￿ ation is incorporated.
-Figure 2 about here-
A surprising feature of this model emerges when one considers the long-
run behavior of in￿ ation and unemployment. From the formal point of view
the derivation of the long-run Phillips curve is straightforward. Assuming ￿ =




(un ￿ u) (10)
where un = d
c:
In this framework the natural rate of unemployment un is not the usual
NAIRU, but it represents the unemployment rate that occurs when all ￿rms are
rational. It can be derived simply by imposing ￿ = 0 on equation (10), since
disregarding zero in￿ ation is equivalent to fully rational behavior. Figure 3
clearly shows that the long-run Phillips curve (10) will not generally be vertical.
-Figure 3 about here-
The interesting macroeconomic implication of near rational neglect of in-
￿ ation, is that the long-run Phillips Curve is no longer vertical, but backward
bending. The relationship becomes non-monotonous due to the presence of the
coe¢ cient ￿, which varies with the in￿ ation rate.
At both zero and very high in￿ ation, ignoring in￿ ation is either fully ratio-
nal or excessively costly, for this reason in both cases the unemployment rate is
close to its natural level: in the former case because even near rational ￿rms are
fully rational disregarding zero in￿ ation, in the latter case because ￿ is close to
one, and all price setters have become completely rational. By contrast, at low
in￿ ation near rationality kicks in: losses from ignoring in￿ ation are quite small,
￿ is always positive but smaller than one, and many near-rational ￿rms set a
wage that is lower than the wage set by fully rational ￿rms. As this implies
a lower average wage compared to the wage in an economy where all ￿rms al-
ways behave rationally, unemployment will be lower than the natural rate. This
explains a long-run negative trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and unemployment at
low in￿ ation rates. However as in￿ ation rises, there are two opposing forces at
work, the grease and sand e⁄ects we mentioned earlier. While near rational
￿rms ignore higher in￿ ation rates, which tends to further reduce unemployment
(grease e⁄ect), it also becomes increasingly costly for ￿rms to behave this way.
8More and more ￿rms switch to full rationality (￿ ￿! 1) and hence set higher
wages, which in turn tends to increase unemployment (sand e⁄ect). In this in-
stance, the Lowest Sustainable Unemployment Rate of In￿ation (LSURI) plays
a fundamental role.
Below the LSURI, the grease e⁄ect dominates, and unemployment decreases
to its lowest sustainable level, i.e. the lowest sustainable unemployment rate
(LSUR). Above the LSURI, the sand e⁄ect prevails, and the share of rational
￿rms increases to such an extent that unemployment starts to increase. This
explains the existence of the upward sloping segment of the long-run Phillips
Curve at high in￿ ation rates. The process continues until in￿ ation has reached
the level at which all ￿rms have switched to fully rational behavior. At this
level of in￿ ation and above, unemployment is again at its natural rate and the
Phillips Curve becomes vertical.
It is worth explaining the di⁄erence between an LSURI approach, and a
NAIRU or natural rate approach to in￿ ation. In the NAIRU framework, a
short-run standpoint is assumed, and in￿ ation is considered as an indicator of
the state of economic equilibrium. If in￿ ation is increasing, it means that unem-
ployment is below the NAIRU: the economy is over-heating, and the monetary
authority should enact contractionary monetary policy. The reverse holds if
in￿ ation is falling. By contrast in an LSURI framework, even if we assume a
long-run perspective, in￿ ation is viewed as an adjustment mechanism that fa-
cilitates labor market adjustment. If in￿ ation is below the LSURI, an increase
in in￿ ation will lower the equilibrium unemployment rate. If it is above the
LSURI, it will raise it. In￿ ation is therefore an adjustment mechanism that
can be calibrated optimally in the long-run, aiming at the lowest sustainable
unemployment. However, just as the NAIRU is an unobservable concept, so too
is the LSURI, and it should be empirically estimated as it varies structurally
for each economy.
Some authors6 argue that the LSURI should be seen as a guiding concept
for in￿ ation targeting, although in an European Union framework this objective
may prove potentially problematic: there is nothing to suggest that long-run
trade-o⁄s between in￿ ation and unemployment are identical across European
countries. It is also for this reason that it is interesting to develop further the
issue of empirical estimation of the LSURI, and to draw some practical policy
implications.
3 The Italian evidence
3.1 ADP￿ s procedure
The standard procedure for the empirical estimation of the ADP (2000) model
requires ￿rst to estimate a short-run Phillips curve of the form (9), and then
numerically compute from the estimated parameters the long-run Phillips curve
and its key indicators, the natural rate of unemployment, the LSUR and the
6See Lundborg, SacklŁn (2003, 2006) and Palley (2003) among others.
9LSURI. The validity of this procedure is of course an open question, as long-run
behavior and short-run deviations should theoretically be captured by a cointe-
gration relationship. For this reason we apply the ADP-procedure, followed by
robustness tests of our results following Wyplosz￿ s (2001) approach, which has
a cointegration interpretation.
Recall that the short-run Phillips curve we wish to estimate is:
￿t = d ￿ cut + ￿￿e
t + g￿ue
t (11)
It is worth repeating that ￿ is not a simple parameter, but a function of
in￿ ation as it represents the share of rational ￿rms at each level of in￿ ation.
Formally ￿ is a cumulative standard distribution of losses implied by near ra-
tional behavior, where the loss thresholds are also normally distributed among
price setters and equation(8) explicitly describes the argument of this cumula-
tive function.
The estimation of the entire model would require estimation of all the struc-
tural parameters (￿;￿;￿";￿￿) in￿ uencing ￿, which is particularly complicated
in the absence of large samples. Consequently, ADP approximate the argument
of (8) by D+E￿2
L. We follow their simpli￿cation. It can be shown that in prac-
tice that only two parameters are required in order to capture the dynamics of
the argument of the cumulative normal distribution when in￿ ation varies.7
Therefore, approximating L ’ D + E￿2
L, the empirical speci￿cation of our
short-run Phillips Curve becomes:
￿t = d + g1ue
t + g2ut￿1 + ￿(D + E￿2
L)￿e
t + kxt + ￿t (14)
where d;g1;g2;D;E and k are parameters to be estimated, xt
8 is a vector
of dummy variables and ￿t is the error term.
With regards to ￿L, the theoretic model tells us only that its squared value
should have a positive e⁄ect on ￿ (E should be large and positive): past high
in￿ ation should make people increasingly rational and dissipate their money
7To see this, consider the Taylor series approximation of the loss function (7) around a
value of zero in￿ation
L ’ L(￿ = 0) +
dL
d￿





j￿=0(￿ ￿ 0)2 + ::: (12)
The loss will be positive but small at zero in￿ation, so the constant term will likely be
present. The ￿rst order term will be null at zero in￿ation, and very small with in￿ation
ranging between 1 and 10 percent, as the de￿nition of near rationality requires. Furthermore
simulations conducted by ADP show that the second order term will be relevant, while third
and higher order terms will not. This is the rationale of making the following approximation:
L ’ D + E￿2
L (13)
Where ￿2
L approximates the e⁄ects of past in￿ation on the loss implied by near rational
behaviour, and in practice will be estimated as a univariate forecast of actual in￿ation.
8As an alternative to dummy variables, in order to take into account supply shocks some
speci￿cations employ price changes of energy (fuel electricity and gasoline) and of food. See
the appendix for details.
10illusion. For this reason in line with ADP, we proxy ￿L with three di⁄erent
speci￿cations.
The ￿rst is a geometrically declining weighted moving average of past in￿ a-
tion:
￿L = (1 ￿ ￿)￿L￿1 + ￿￿L (15)
where ￿ is estimated.
We also estimate ￿L as a four year (16 quarter) moving average of past








￿i = 1 and relative weights ￿i are estimated.
In some speci￿cations we also used Box-Jenkins univariate methods to esti-
mate ￿L as an autoregressive polynomial with lag length n to be identi￿ed:
p(L)￿L = ￿t (17)
Where p(L)￿L = ￿t￿p1L￿t￿p2L2￿t￿:::￿pnLn￿t and L is the lag operator.
In standard practice in￿ ation expectations ￿e are estimated applying some
adaptive expectations scheme. In line with ADP, we ￿rst use a twelve-quarter
unrestricted lag or a simple exponential smoothing method as in (15). Alterna-
tively we employ Ball￿ s (2000) de￿nition of near rational expectations, treating
￿e as an optimal univariate forecast. This implies that we should again employ
Box-Jenkins procedure as in (17), identifying the appropriate ARMA structure
for the in￿ ation data generating process. Alternatively, following Debelle and
Vickery (1998), and more recently Wyplosz (2001), we also use the Fisher equa-
tion to proxy long term expected in￿ ation. Hence as a measure of ￿e we take the
di⁄erence between the nominal rate on long-term Italian bonds and a measure
of the world real interest rate r￿:
￿e = iLT ￿ r￿ (18)
where the world real interest rate is computed as the di⁄erence between the
long-term US Treasury bond rate, and a ￿ve-year moving average of American
CPI in￿ ation.9
In line with ￿e, also ue is constructed using adaptive expectations schemes,
and the appropriate number of lags is separately estimated for each speci￿ca-
tion. The measure we took for unemployment is the total unemployment rate
9This approximation assumes that Italy can be considered a small open economy, taking
the world real interest rate as uniform and given. In any case Debelle and Vickery (1998)
argue that the results are not sensitive to the precise calculation of the real interest rate.
11calculated by the Italian statistical o¢ ce ISTAT, and re-scaled by US Bureau
of Labor Statistics, to facilitate international comparisons.10
For the dependent variable we used three di⁄erent measures of in￿ ation:
the annualized percentage change in the Italian consumer price index, in the
de￿ ator for GDP at market prices, and in the de￿ ator for personal consumption
expenditures.
We used quarterly data from the ￿rst quarter of 1960 to the fourth quarter of
2003, all taken from the OECD Statistical Compendium. The sample consists in
176 observations, although in some speci￿cations we are forced to use a smaller
sub-sample due to the large number of lags and to missing data. Detailed
variables de￿nitions and the speci￿cation of the dummy variables used can be
found in the Appendix. All the parameters of the model were estimated using
Non-Linear Least Squares methods.
3.2 ADP￿ s procedure: results
Italian prices have experienced periods of huge increases between the mid sev-
enties and the eighties, whatever measure of in￿ ation we consider. It was the
period after the Dollar devaluation, the period of Oil shocks and great union
con￿ icts, when Italian in￿ ation reached peaks never achieved previously. Both
the new wage indexation system (the so called ￿Scala Mobile￿ ) and the devalu-
ation of the Italian currency contributed to the creation of high price volatility.
While in the 1990s in￿ ation decreased but remained at sustained levels, in the
￿nal part of the sample it averages at lower rates, between 3 and 5 percent. It is
clear that at that time Italy could never be considered a ￿ virtuous country￿with
respect to in￿ ation. On the other hand, in the recent years of the European
monetary regime, it displays in￿ ation slightly below the European average. On
the unemployment side, we can say that despite the recent decline, the current
unemployment rate is still rather high from long-run perspective: 6% in Septem-
ber 2007, just one percentage point less than the European average. However
in the time period we considered (1960-2003), the Italian unemployment rate
has generally been higher that the European average, and probably institutional
reforms in the labor market account for a structural break at some point in the
sample.
How does the near rational Phillips Curve model ￿t our Italian data? Table
1 presents our results concerning the estimation of the short-run Phillips curve
in equation (14), where we chose our preferred regressions in terms of ￿t and
summary statistics.11
-Table 1 about here-
10For a detailed description on the methodology used see ￿Unemployment Rates: Approxi-
mating U.S. Concepts￿series in Comparative Civilian Labor Force Statistics: Ten Countries,
1959￿ 1999", published on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website.
11Many regression, with di⁄erent combinations of the dependent variables and di⁄erent sam-
ples, have been estimated. The ones we present here are those which seem more representative
to our eyes.
12The value of D is always small and generally signi￿cant, implying that the
coe¢ cients on expectations at in￿ ation close to zero, range between 12 percent
and 50 percent depending on the speci￿cations. The share of ￿rms completely
taking into account future in￿ ation in wage setting is already consistent at price
stability, and increases as in￿ ation rises.
Another key parameter is E, the coe¢ cient multiplying the square of lagged
in￿ ation in ￿(:). It represents the state-dependent part of our Phillips curve; if
it is zero, the coe¢ cient on expected in￿ ation would not vary with past rates
of in￿ ation, and the standard in￿ ation-augmented Phillips Curve would be ob-
tained. By contrast, Italian price setters seem to incorporate future in￿ ation
di⁄erently in their decisions depending on past in￿ ation being low or high: the
estimated value of E is always signi￿cant and positive. Nevertheless, when com-
pared to US or Swedish estimates, the di⁄erences in its order of magnitude are
striking. LS￿results for parameter E were in the order of magnitude of 400-500,
ADP￿ s were between 1700 and 2800, while ours range between 18,77 and 25,16.
Fortunately, Dickens preliminary results on some other European countries are
a little bit more similar to ours.
To see the implication of these di⁄erences we examine Table 2, which contains
the estimates of the Italian natural rate of unemployment, the LSUR and the
LSURI. Additionally table 3 reports these indicators as estimated inside and
outside the US.
-Table 2 and Table 3 about here-
While almost all American and Swedish ￿rms have become rational actors at
an in￿ ation rate ranging between 4 and 6 percent, at that same in￿ ation rates
only half of Italian price setters totally incorporate in￿ ation. In the majority of
our speci￿cations a yearly in￿ ation rate in the order of 25-30 percent is necessary
to turn all price setters into fully rational actors.
This in turn re￿ ects the estimated value of the lowest sustainable unemploy-
ment rate, which is important because it indicates the point at which the long-
run Phillips Curve stops being negatively sloped. The Swedish data suggested
that 2.3 percent of unemployment could be obtained raising the in￿ ation target
to roughly 5 percent; ADP also found that at in￿ ation rates ranging between 3
and 4 percent signi￿cant reduction in unemployment could be obtained.
Italian data look much more similar to French and British data, reported
on the right side of table 3. The natural unemployment rate, which represents
the rate that prevails when all money illusion has vanished due to high in￿ a-
tion, varies from 9 percent to 14 percent. Correspondingly the LSUR occurs at
extremely high in￿ ation rates, between 16 and 19 percent, with a concurrent
implication of incredibly low values of unemployment. The most reasonable
estimate comes from the GDP de￿ ator speci￿cation and it is roughly 5 percent.
These results are unsurprising. As Dickens (2001) claimed, there are many
di¢ culties in applying the near rational model to European countries. For
example Dickens could not derive a backward-bending Phillips curve in the
cases of both Germany and of France, mainly because he found a negative or
13zero constant term, implying that ￿nding an asymptote of unemployment as
in￿ ation increases is impossible. This class of problems is not present in our
data, the expected backward-bending shape of the long-run Phillips curve can
be inferred from our estimates. However the backward-bending segment persists
till such high in￿ ation rates that it is likely never to bend forward, unless Italy
experiences an episode of hyper-in￿ ation. If that was the case, such a high
in￿ ation rate would be so costly for Italy inside the European Union that the
loss in terms of lower competitiveness and ￿nancial instability would more than
overcome the bene￿ts from the (uncertain) reduction of unemployment. For
these reasons we conclude that the ADP-procedure applied to Italian data for
￿sensible￿ in￿ ation ranges, implies just a negatively sloped long-run Phillips
Curve.
Figure 4 summarizes the crucial features of the long-run Phillips Curve im-
plied by our regressions: for each regression reported in table 1, we evaluated the
long-run unemployment rate corresponding to in￿ ation from zero to 35 percent,
according to equation (10)12. To obtain the ￿average￿Italian Phillips curve, we
evaluated the average unemployment rate at the di⁄erent levels of in￿ ation. The
black spotted lines represent the natural rate and the LSUR intervals, varying
with the di⁄erent speci￿cations.
-Figure 4 about here-
Can the Phillips curve in ￿gure 4 predict Italian recent economic perfor-
mance? First of all we already said that ￿gure 4 should be considered only in its
lower part, for a sensible in￿ ation range that could be 0-8 percent. In addition,
the ADP-procedure has several other shortcomings. One of its major prob-
lems is that it does not allow one to discriminate between short-run deviations
from the long-run, and the long-run structure itself. The long-run indicators
are numerically computed according to the short-term estimated parameters. It
could well be that the support for the ADP-type Phillips curve simply re￿ ects
a mispeci￿ed model, which does not take into consideration shifts of a verti-
cal long-run Phillips curve due to institutional changes or productivity growth.
Furthermore only the NAIRU model with its vertical curve can be nested in
such a Phillips Curve.13 This makes it di¢ cult to assess the risk that the data
are in fact generated along the lines of some other model (associated with a
non-vertical long-run Phillips curve). In which case, our support for the ADP-
type Phillips curve would have followed mainly from functional misspeci￿cation.
Dickens (2001) presents regressions that also include a term for nominal wage
rigidity, arguing that this could be the crucial variable when one deals with
12It was necessary to set a maximum in￿ation rate this high to show where the vertical
segment of the Phillips Curve starts.
13As we already said the standard in￿ation augmented short-run Phillips Curve emerges if
the data imply a D coe¢ cient which is big and positive, and an E coe¢ cient which is small
and insigni￿cant. In such a case the ￿ coe¢ cient would be almost one and not dependent
on ￿; yielding an accelerationist Phillips Curve in the short-run and a vertical one in the
long-run.
14European countries. Indeed near-rationality and nominal wage rigidity could
play a major role in unionized labor markets, and this is a promising route for
future research. Nevertheless, we want to make it clear that the rejection of
the NAIRU model in our data, does not exclude the relevance of other models
yielding non-vertical long-run Phillips curves.
3.3 An alternative approach: capturing long-run nonlin-
earities
Wyplosz￿ s (2001) approach could prove useful on the issue of identifying any non-
linearities in the long-run Phillips Curve, besides the backward-bending shape
derived by ADP. Dickens (2001) states that it should be used as a complemen-
tary technique to ADP-type estimation.
Wyplosz￿ s atheoretic approach of estimating nonlinearities in the relation-
ship between long-run unemployment and in￿ ation has several advantages and
disadvantages. The method is particularly powerful in identifying other in￿ u-
ences on the shape of the long-run Phillips Curve, which cannot be identi￿ed
under the ADP speci￿cation. It might prove to be a powerful tool in testing
the e⁄ect of nominal rigidities and near rationality together, where the func-
tional form of the trade o⁄is estimated and not a priori assumed. Signi￿cantly,
the procedure explicitly takes into account short-run deviations from the steady
state equilibrium, as it estimates the long-run relationship as a cointegrating
equation.
Of course there are disadvantages to take into account. The procedure does
not give much credence to the e⁄ect of productivity growth, which may shift
the Phillips curve up or down. A measure of Tobin￿ s Q is included in order to
attempt to capture such e⁄ects. Furthermore, this procedure has been criticized
for not having its roots in a solid theoretical model, but one may argue that it
is consequently less vulnerable to misspeci￿cation.
Along with Dickens￿suggestions, in order to see whether our results are
robust, we will also investigate the shape of the Italian long-run Phillips Curve
employing Wyplosz￿ s approach. In particular we want to understand whether it
is plausible that the Italian long-run Phillips Curve displays a negatively sloped
shape until extremely high in￿ ation rates.
Our procedure14 consists of the estimation of a cointegrating relationship
along the lines of an Engel and Granger (1987) two-step method. A polynomial
14Actually Wysplosz (2001) takes a slightly di⁄erent approach from ours to estimate the
long-run relation between in￿ation and unemployment. He ￿rst estimates a standard near-
accelerartionist Phillips Curve with a polynomial in long-term in￿ation. Then he includes the
polynomial in the long-run equation to predict unemployment directly, and sees the short-run
accelerationist Phillips Curve as a possible ECM representation of in￿ation-unemployment
dynamics. Nevertheless he admits that the cointegrating interpretation shouldn￿ t be pushed
too far because his ECM model doesn￿ t follow the standard speci￿cation. Furthermore nonlin-
earities in the long-run equation preclude the use of Johansen￿ s rank procedure (see Wysplosz
(2001) p. 24). As we are mainly interested in a robustness check of our previous long-run
results we estimated a traditional cointegration system, where the long-run equilibrium is the
same as in Wysplozs, but the ECM representation is the standard one. This approach per-
forms much better with our Italian data than Wysplosz￿ s original one, and seems to be more
15in a ￿ve-year moving average of expected in￿ ation is introduced to allow non-
linearities in the long-run equation to predict unemployment directly15. The
corresponding ECM model is estimated, in order to link properly the long-run
and short-run behaviors.
The cointegrating system we estimate is the following:
ut = c + exp(#￿t)P(￿t) + ￿qt + ￿u
t (19)
￿ut = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿e
t ￿ ￿t￿1) + ￿￿￿t + ￿￿u
t￿1 + ￿￿qt + ￿xt + ￿t (20)
Where P(￿t) is a second or third order polynomial of long-term lagged in-
￿ ation, and # ￿ 0 is a parameter to be estimated. qt is a measure of Tobin￿ s Q,
introduced to account for productivity shifts (Phelps and Zoega, 2000). Here
the vector xt contains dummy variables accounting for oil shocks and other
temporary supply shocks, together with price changes of food, energy prices
and imported goods.
Equation (19) is a ￿ exible speci￿cation to capture grease and sand e⁄ects
of in￿ ation on unemployment. Given wage rigidity, it is not expected to hold
at every point in time but it is built to capture nonlinearities in long-term
unemployment-in￿ ation relationship. It can be seen as a cointegration relation-
ship in some way similar to a long-run Phillips curve where nonlinearities are
explicitly taken into account. Equation (20) can be seen as its error correction
representation, if the residuals ￿u
t are found to be stationary.
Here we brie￿ y describe how we constructed the variables in (19) and (20).
Basically we took our GDP de￿ ator speci￿cation in table 1 and re-elaborated
to make it compatible with the cointegrating interpretation.
As a measure of the unemployment rate we used again the BLS measure,
and we took the annualized percentage change in the Italian GDP de￿ ator as a
measure of in￿ ation.
Long-term in￿ ation is approximated by a ￿ve years moving average of ex-







t￿i for every t (21)
The measure of Tobin￿ s Q, qt , was calculated as the ratio of the price in-
dex of Italian shares to the investment de￿ ator, normalized to the zero-unity
interval over the sample.17 In (19) a time trend is also included to account for
econometrically coherent.
15Wysplosz allows for an exponential decay factor exp(#￿t), where ￿ ￿ 0;multyplying the
polynominal of expected in￿ation.This is to ensure that the in￿ation e⁄ect dissipates when
in￿ation becomes large.
16Theoretically long-term in￿ation should be given by ￿t = ￿e
t = ￿t , but as this de￿nition
is not su¢ cient to derive a time series, Wysploz (2001) approximates long-term in￿ation as a
￿ve year moving average of ￿e
t.
17We exactly employed Wyplosz￿ s approximation of Tobin￿ s Q. The theoretic relevance of
including a measure of Tobin￿Q in studying unemployment is discussed in Phelps and Zoega
(2000).
16unmodelled demand and supply shocks a⁄ecting the labor market. All data are
quarterly and taken from the OECD statistical compendium. In this speci￿ca-
tion they span from 1966 to 1999.
3.4 Capturing long-run nonlinearities: results
Table 4 shows the results of estimating system (19 and 20) by means of Non-
Linear Least Squares.
-Table 4 about here-
Note that the ￿rst parameter of the second order polynomial is signi￿cant,
but the parameter on squared in￿ ation is not precisely estimated. Nevertheless
it is negative, providing support for the presence of grease and sand e⁄ects of
in￿ ation. Generally, the other parameters are signi￿cant and carry the expected
sign, and especially the error correction parameter which is negative and active.
The strong signi￿cance of the linear trend in the long-run equation however
may be due to the absence of other labor market variables in our model. We
can ￿nally derive the representative long-run Phillips Curve implied by these
new results: if its shape is comparable to that which we found in the previous
section then we can feel a bit more con￿dent in our results.
Figure 5 shows the simulated path of long-term unemployment when in￿ a-
tion ranges between 0 and 40%.18 To compute long-run unemployment we used
the cointegrating equation reported in table 4, setting all the terms other than
in￿ ation at their sample means.
-Figure 5 about here-
It is comforting to compare ￿gure 5 with ￿gure 4, the ADP-type Phillips
curve. They look quite similar, presenting both a backward bending shape and
a tendency to become vertical at very high in￿ ation rates. Furthermore both
curves bend forward at an unemployment rate close to 5 percent, corresponding
at a very high in￿ ation of almost 20 percent. By contrast, the most striking
di⁄erence between the two curves is that they imply two di⁄erent natural un-
employment rates: in ￿gure 4 zero in￿ ation corresponded to a natural rate of 15
percent, while in ￿gure 5 the natural rate is near to 8 percent, a more reasonable
value.
On the basis of these results, what can we argue about the Italian long-
run Phillips curve? Considering that a yearly in￿ ation rate of 15-20 percent
is not likely to occur, nor would it be desirable, we can only conclude that
there is reasonably strong evidence for a long-run in￿ ation unemployment trade-
o⁄ in Italy. It is sensible therefore to cut o⁄ the unrealistic sections of both
￿gure 5 and ￿gure 4. Figure 6 suggests the possible shape of the representative
Italian Phillips Curve consistent with our estimates implied by both ADP￿ s and
Wysploz￿ s procedures. It has been computed as an average of the ADP-type
and Wyplosz￿ type long-run results, and It is negatively sloped for positive and
moderate in￿ ation rates.
18As before, we needed to set such a wide in￿ation range, in order to show where the Phillips
curve tends to become vertical with the Italian data.
17-Figure 6 about here-
4 General discussion and concluding remarks
The ADP (2000) model of near rational behavior in price and wage setting yields
very controversial results about the long-run unemployment-in￿ ation trade o⁄.
We showed that Italian data seem to partly con￿rm ADP￿ s results: a long-run
trade-o⁄ exists, and is negative at low and moderate in￿ ation rates. Whether
ADP￿ s results are con￿rmed at higher in￿ ation rates is an open question. How-
ever, ADP￿ s model has been widely criticized, both for its theoretical founda-
tions and for its policy implications. In what follows we discuss the strengths
and weaknesses of the model, and outline its policy implications.
Three fundamental questions are addressed:
￿ Does near rationality always have a positive e⁄ect on unemployment?
￿ Is the Lowest Sustainable Unemployment Rate (LSUR) a sustainable equi-
librium in the long-run?
￿ What is the role of economic policy in the ADP framework?
Regarding the ￿rst problem, recall that the ADP model is a pure e¢ ciency
wage model which sought to represent the American labor market. Wages are
set unilaterally by ￿rms, that estimate the e⁄ort exerted by their workers with
di⁄erent real wages. Ignoring or underweighting future expected in￿ ation im-
plies setting a nominal wage lower than what should be required to satisfy the
Solow condition. The average wage is thus lower than it should be compared to
aggregate demand, and as a result employment is higher at low in￿ ation rates.
It is clear that this is not the only possible scenario. Blinder (2000) notes
that if labor demand is a decreasing function of the real wage, one should expect
that the ￿rms￿misperception implies an underde￿ ation of money wages, and
hence an overestimation of expected real wages, compared to actual real wages.
Firms would demand less labor and aggregate unemployment should increase.
Furthermore, another type of cognitive error could occur: if ￿rms overweight
in￿ ation,instead of underweighting it employment would again be reduced.19
Of course the main di⁄erence between ADP￿ s model and European reality is
the structure of the labor market. In many European countries the labor market
is highly centralized and union bargaining issues contribute strongly to explain
consistent wage rigidity, and this is even more so in the Italian labor market.
Several attempts have been made to study the e⁄ects of union bargaining in
an e¢ ciency wage framework, as it is quite likely that these two issues interact
(See for example Bulkley and Myles,1997, a and b). One of the main results
19Overestimating in￿ation is not an infrequent occurrence in European countries, particu-
larly if one recalls the episode of high perceived in￿ation after the introduction of the Euro.
Indeed this type of error is more likely to occur in the context of consumer behaviour than in
the context of ￿rm behaviour.
18of this literature is that because e⁄ort can only be imperfectly controlled, if a
monopolistic union decides wages while ￿rms determine employment and e⁄ort,
it will set wages higher relative to the competitive solution and thus a higher
level of e⁄ort will be exerted. What would the outcome of combining near
rationality in wage setting and such a monopolistic union be? The impulsive
answer is that probably wages would be higher, and with e⁄ort and employment
being perfect substitutes in ADP￿ s model, the higher level of exerted e⁄ort could
even imply higher aggregate unemployment.
Bhalotra (2006) reaches similar results, but starting from a di⁄erent point of
departure. She notes that examining near rational behavior in an e¢ ciency wage
setting is particularly interesting, as there are positive but decreasing returns
to increasing the wage beyond the e¢ cient level. She suggests that employers
may in fact behave near rationally when they allow for small and positive wage
deviations, accounting of union power. Her evidence suggests that this could
be the case in the United Kingdom, while in the United States pure e¢ ciency
wages seem to provide an appropriate description of the labor market. In ADP,
paying lower wages implied second order losses for near rational ￿rms when
in￿ ation was low, and hence unemployment was lower. What would the costs
be to a ￿rm if it pays a wage slightly higher than the e¢ ciency wage? If
these costs are negligible, European ￿rms may give in to union demands with
negative consequences for unemployment. It is true that near rational behavior
in wage setting as argued by Bhalotra does not imply any connection between
wages and in￿ ation. Nevertheless, it seems to yield the same implications as
Blinder￿ s results: such near rationality in wage setting would reduce aggregate
employment.
Summarizing, in ADP near rationality is equivalent to a downward shift of
the No Shirking Condition (NSC), holding labor demand constant.20 On the
contrary, Bhalotra and Blinder￿ s idea of near rationality, implies that the NSC
may in fact shift upward. Figure 7 clearly shows that the aggregate consequences
in terms of employment are very di⁄erent.
-Figure 7 about here-
Indeed a promising route for future research could be focused on assessing
whether the two arguments we presented could signi￿cantly change the macro-
economic results of the entire model. For the moment, caution is necessary
when drawing conclusions with respect to unemployment.
Regarding the long-run sustainability of the LSUR and the accompanying
rate of in￿ ation, the debate is also open. Indeed ADP are ￿rmly convinced
20In Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) the No Shirking Condition (NSC) is an upward sloping
schedule which links the real wage to be paid by the ￿rm to prevent workers from shirking,
and the number of workers actually employed. In the usual e¢ ciency wage framework, the
NSC plays the role that labour supply does in a competitive labour market. Of course,
being the e¢ ciency wage higher than the competitive real wage, the NSC will be positioned
above and to the left of the competitive labour supply, implying involuntary unemployment
in equilibrium. Indeed ADP never talk in terms of NSC, but as they work in an e¢ ciency
wage setting, they implicitly see high real wages as a deterrent to workers￿moral hazard, as
well as a ￿morale booster￿.
19of the fact that some low in￿ ation could actually improve macroeconomic per-
formance, ￿greasing the wheels￿ of the labor market, and reducing long-run
unemployment. Moreover recently Akerlof and Yellen (2006) have also a¢ rmed
that policy makers should be concerned both with maintaining low in￿ ation
and with stabilizing output volatility. They argue that with Phillips Curves like
(9) and (10), such policies would bring nonnegligible gains in employment and
welfare. Nevertheless even ADP show themselves quite cautious in encouraging
central banks to target the LSURI. They admit that it is not clear whether
this in￿ ation rate accompanies an unemployment rate, the LSUR, which also
maximizes output. LS (2003) showed that in ADP￿ s model, depending on the
parameters output may increase or decrease with in￿ ation,and hence it must
be empirically investigated whether output is maximized roughly at the same
rate at which unemployment is minimized. The issue needs to be evaluated
empirically for every country, but clearly our Italian estimates are so extreme
that they cast some doubts on the validity of the theoretical model itself. Em-
pirical studies about ADP-type Phillips Curves outside the US, suggest that the
grease and sand e⁄ects are likely to in￿ uence di⁄erently the shape of the long-
run unemployment in￿ ation trade-o⁄ in every country21. Particularly the labor
market structure, the strength of wage bargaining issues, and mostly the degree
of nominal wage rigidities, are of particular signi￿cance in explaining the di⁄er-
ent patterns of long-run unemployment and in￿ ation. In addition, productivity
growth and supply shocks must also be taken into account. Our empirical spec-
i￿cation ignores many of these factors, and this could explain why our results
are somewhat puzzling.
Moreover we recalled Blinder￿ s (2000) doubts that the LSUR could be op-
timal and sustainable from a welfare point of view. He further argues that
allowing for explicit in￿ ation costs, which are absent in the ADP model, the
LSURI could actually prove too high, overcompensating for the bene￿ts of min-
imal unemployment. This could especially be true for our Italian estimates,
where we obtained a LSURI averaging at 15-20 percent, far too high from what
the ECB would see as an appropriate in￿ ation target.22 Blinder￿ s argument
against optimality is reinforced by LS￿(2003) results regarding social optima in
the ADP model, since they argued that from a theoretical viewpoint it cannot
be excluded that a negative in￿ ation output trade-o⁄ exists. Yet some scholars
of the Post-Keynesian school of thought, such as Palley (2006) and Summers
(1991), argue that the LSURI has the potential advantage of providing an in-
￿ ation margin allowing for a negative real interest rate. In case the nominal
rate hits the zero ￿ oor it should avoid a de￿ ationary trap. Still in the Euro era
of price stability, de￿ ationary spirals seem quite low on the list of phenomena
demanding policy attention.
Finally, we would like to raise another question: would the LSURI be a dy-
21See Lundborg and SacklØn (2003, 2006), Wysploz (2001) and Dickens (2001,commenting
on Wysploz).
22Furthermore, a standard result in monetary economics is that price volatility increases
with high in￿ation (Cukierman (1984)), and this would render such an high in￿ation target
even more costly.
20namically stable position? As a negative output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄ could occur
at low in￿ ation rates, the shape of the long-run Aggregate Supply curve could
cease being vertical, and even become downward-sloping. If this was the case,
a dynamic stability problem would occur when considering the AD-AS equilib-
rium: it would only be stable if the AD curve were accidentally more rigid than
the AS curve. Otherwise we would be condemned to endless in￿ ationary or
de￿ ationary spirals. The weaknesses we have just analyzed suggest a need to be
cautious about encouraging Central Banks to use a LSURI-targeting approach.
Finally, let us try to answer to the most relevant question, concerning the
role of economic policy in ADP￿ s framework. ADP￿ s model implies a concave
long-run Phillips Curve, where a negative trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and un-
employment emerges at low in￿ ation rates. Our estimates for the Italian econ-
omy suggest that such a trade-o⁄ may indeed be present in the long-run, al-
though we must admit that these results should be taken with caution. At the
same time, the estimated Italian short-run Phillips Curve seems more reliable,
and it strongly rejects the accelerationist hypothesis. Any policy conclusions
drawn from our evidence must thus clearly distinguish between long-run and
the short-run outcomes. Akerlof and Yellen (2006) argue that price stability
must be viewed as an important long-term policy objective. Given the possible
persistent trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and unemployment at low and moderate
in￿ ation rates, central banks have an even stronger rationale than the rational
expectations-credibility models (Barro and Gordon (1984) and Rogo⁄ (1985))
for ￿ghting high in￿ ation. However full price stability, i.e. near zero in￿ ation,
seems inadvisable. The literature agrees on at least three pitfalls in targeting
zero in￿ ation. First, during a contraction, monetary policy would be less ef-
fective because nominal interest rates approach the zero ￿ oor, with the risk of
a positive real rate and the consequent negative impact on investment. Sec-
ond, downward wage-rigidity, implied by workers￿resistance to nominal wage
cuts, could create substantial real wage rigidity if in￿ ation is near zero. Third,
although many have showed that very high in￿ ation yields negative e⁄ects on
growth, there is no evidence that the reverse holds, i.e. that zero in￿ ation fos-
ters growth.23 ADP present a fourth rationale for avoiding very low in￿ ation
targets: in the long-run excessively low in￿ ation targets would imply higher
rates of unemployment because near rational neglect of in￿ ation is not opera-
tional. In such a framework monetary policy should target a low or moderate
in￿ ation rate. As we already said, it is di¢ cult to assess univocally what a mod-
erate in￿ ation rate is. It is even more di¢ cult to say whether the LSURI could
be an appropriate policy target. Hence, at this stage, we can only conclude
like Wyplosz: we do not know how low the European in￿ ation target should
be. Nevertheless, necessary caution requires us also to question the current 0-2
percent target. Concerning the short-run, Akerlof and Yellen (2006) encourage
central banks to exploit the fact that expectations do not respond one-to-one
to in￿ ation and pursue active stabilization policies, i.e. short-run output and
23In Europe, the 60s was a period of fast growth and low unemployment, despite the fact
that in￿ation rates were averaging at 2.5-3.5 percent.
21employment stabilization policies, along with in￿ ation stabilization around a
low or moderate target, provided that it could be sustainable in the long-run.
As De Long and Summers (1988, p.434) put it, economic policy could ￿￿ll in
troughs, without shaving o⁄ peaks￿ . If people actually behave as psychologists
suggest, they will fully incorporate future in￿ ation only if it is very salient;
for example according to our estimates, almost all Italian ￿rms incorporate all
their expected in￿ ation in wage setting only when yearly in￿ ation reaches 15-20
percent. In this case at low initial in￿ ation rates, monetary policy can combat
high unemployment without renouncing the opportunity of having low unem-
ployment in the future. Active stabilization policy is advisable in the short-run:
central banks should contain in￿ ation, preventing in￿ ation from reaching salient
levels, while simultaneously combating recessions.
Figure (8) can help us explaining why short-run stabilization policy can be
so bene￿cial when the Phillips Curve is not accelerationist.
-Figure 8 about here-
With an accelerationist Phillips Curve (left hand side of the picture), a
cyclical downturn at time t implies going from point A to point B, with lower
in￿ ation but higher unemployment. Consequently, agents will revise their in-
￿ ationary expectations downwards and the Phillips Curve will shift downward,
implying lower unemployment for every given in￿ ation target. If the central
bank enacts an expansive monetary policy to maintain the previous in￿ ation
target ￿0, at time t+1 it will bring the economy to point C: unemployment will
be reduced by exactly the same amount by which it had increased during the
recession. Recall that an accelerationist short-run Phillips Curve also implies
a vertical long-run Phillips Curve, so point C will not be a stable equilibrium
and agents will again revise their expectations upwards. Eventually the econ-
omy will go back to the natural rate of unemployment, but the concomitant
equilibrium rate of in￿ ation will be higher.
By contrast, the right side of ￿gure 8 shows that if the coe¢ cient of in￿ ation-
ary expectations is less than one, as it is in the ADP-type curve at low initial
in￿ ation, the outcome will be di⁄erent. Now monetary policy brings the econ-
omy from point B to point D, yielding a much greater decrease in unemployment
than in the previous case. The key di⁄erence is the reaction of the short-run
Phillips Curve to the process of expectations adjustment. A non-accelerationist
Phillips Curve responds to lower expected in￿ ation shifting downwards more
than in the previous case (only ￿￿e enters in the Phillips Curve), and this gives
the central bank the opportunity to restore the in￿ ation target at a much lower
unemployment rate. Note too that for ADP, if the in￿ ation target lies on the
long-run concave Phillips Curve, D will also be a sustainable equilibrium as the
majority of agents will continue to neglect in￿ ation in a near rational manner.
Furthermore, policy-makers might choose the LSURI as the in￿ ation target,
therefore positioning the economy at the leftmost point of the long-run Phillips
Curve. According to this theory, active stabilization policy brings signi￿cant
welfare gains. Whereas, in the traditional NAIRU framework it entails only
22small unemployment reductions in the short-run, and it even reveals detrimen-
tal outcomes in the long-run.
Short-run active stabilization policy therefore seems advisable. It is neces-
sary to assess whether the outcomes would be similar in European countries
where demand management policies are inevitably made more di¢ cult by the
Stability and Growth Pact restrictions. The ADP-type Phillips Curve provides
an even stronger motivation to criticize the pact. Many have already claimed
that it is insu¢ ciently ￿ exible and that it needs to be applied over the eco-
nomic cycle, rather than over one calendar year. In reality, the Commission
has recently acknowledged that speci￿c country conditions have to be take into
account when evaluating ￿scal policies. Given the di¢ culties for single coun-
tries in using the ￿scal stimuli countercyclically, there seem to be two possible
solutions for the European Union. The ￿rst is quite di¢ cult to accomplish as it
requires a political agreement between the member states. It consists of central-
izing or coordinating ￿scal policies at the community level in order to render
the stabilization policy e⁄ective at a Euro level. Nevertheless the literature
hasn￿ t yet reached a consensus about the net e⁄ect of ￿scal coordination in a
monetary union. The second method seems more easily achievable: monetary
policy could aim at both stabilizing in￿ ation and output. Fontana and Palacio-
Vera (2005) suggest that such a monetary policy could employ what they call
a ￿exible-opportunistic approach to disin￿ation. The pure opportunistic ap-
proach (Orphanides et al. (2002)) suggests that when in￿ ation is moderate, but
still above the long-run objective, the central bank should not take deliberate
anti-in￿ ationary action but, rather, should wait for exogenous circumstances,
such as favorable supply shocks and unforeseen recessions, to deliver the desired
reduction in in￿ ation. The consequences on unemployment would obviously
be quite di⁄erent: favorable in the ￿rst instance, disastrous in the second. In
the meanwhile, high in￿ ation should, however, be fought aggressively. Further-
more, the ￿ exible opportunist approach suggests to substitute the notion of a
strict in￿ ation target with that of a target zone, which would lead to a policy
of monetary tightening only when current and expected in￿ ation exceed the
target-zone. Part of this approach implies that when current in￿ ation is at the
long-run target or when in￿ ation is below the target, the central bank should
adopt a strategy of lowering the real interest rate, in order to trigger some of
the positive path dependent e⁄ects of long-term employment and output that
emerge in ADP￿ s model.
We do not know yet whether any of these suggested strategies would prove to
be useful for the ECB. Further research is necessary in order to asses the validity
of ADP￿ s approach to near rationality and of its macroeconomic implications.
Certainly many doubts emerge in terms of the microfoundations of the model,
and with respect to its policy implications for a country like Italy that belongs
to a monetary union.
The ECB is strongly committed to an in￿ ation target of 2 percent. It is not
likely to change its strategy along the lines of the prescriptions we have discussed,
at least not until a more robust consensus is reached. Regardless of this fact,
structurally high unemployment is an extant phenomenon in Italy and in many
23others European countries. Long-run policies to enhance the ￿ exibility and the
competitiveness of our labor market should probably still be encouraged. Higher
productivity growth would also shift Italy￿ s Phillips Curve downwards, with
signi￿cantly lower unemployment for every long-term in￿ ation target. Since
these policies require a long period of time before their e⁄ects are observable,
the short-run problem of unemployment remains. The unhappy conclusion is
that, although we have bene￿ted greatly from the European Union and the
euro in terms of price stability, we lack the monetary and ￿scal instruments for
a demand management policy. Given the above considerations, let us conclude
with an open question: are supply side policies the only tool that remains?
Futher research is needed to answer this question and many other unresolved
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Figure 2: Short-run non accelerationist Phillips Curve
25Figure 3: Representative long-run Phillips Curve [Source: ADP (2000)]
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Figure 6: Average long-run Italian Phillips Curve for a sensible in￿ ation range
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Figure 8: Short-run unemployment e⁄ects of a recession with accelerationist
and ADP-type Phillips Curves.
Tables
Costant 0.051*** 0.033*** 0.124***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.012)
coefficient of Unemployment - 0.541** - 0.22 ** - 1.22*
(0.049) (0.008) (0.581)
D ( constant in coefficient on expectations) - 0.01 - 1.26*** - 1.18***
(- 0.081) (0.175) (0.142)
E ( coefficient on      ) 18.77** 31.02*** 25.16***
(2.472) (3.824) (2.292)
method for constructing geometric 2- unrestricted lag 6- unrestricted lag
method for constructing inflation expectations 12- unrestricted lag Fisher equation Fisher equation
number of lags in unemployment expectations 32 16 32
method for accounting for supply shocks dummies food and energy prices food and energy prices
R squared 0.95 0.92 0.96
DW- statistic 0.92 1.13 1.43
sample period 1968Q2- 2000Q4  1966Q2 - 1999Q4  1973Q1-  1999Q4
number of observations 131 135 108
(a)  Standard errors in parentheses
* denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** denotes significance at the 5% confidence level,
*** denotes significance at the 1% confidence level.
Estimated parameters for the Near Rational Phillips Curve (a)









31Appendix: Detailed data description and sources
All data were obtained from the OECD statistical compendium.
CPI In￿ ation: Annualized percentage change of Consumer Price Index (All
items), quarterly data . Annualized in￿ ation rate was obtained from quarterly
￿gures as:
inflation = (1 + growthrate(CPI))4 ￿ 1
GDP De￿ ator In￿ ation: Annualized percentage change of De￿ ator for GDP
at Market Prices, quarterly data.
Annualized in￿ ation rate was obtained from quarterly ￿gures as:
inflation = (1 + growthrate(GDP Deflator))4 ￿ 1
PCE De￿ ator In￿ ation: Annualized percentage change of De￿ ator of pri-
vate consumption expenditures, quarterly data. Annualized in￿ ation rate was
obtained from quarterly ￿gures as:
inflation = (1 + growthrate(PCE Deflator)4 ￿ 1
Imported Goods In￿ ation: Annualized percentage change of Import price of
Goods and Services index (IPI), quarterly data. Annualized in￿ ation rate was
obtained from quarterly ￿gures as:
inflation = (1 + growthrate(IPI))4 ￿ 1
Unemployment Rate-Approximating US concepts: Civilian unemployment
rate taken from Bureau of Labor Statistics (ISTAT) website, in the section
￿Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment￿ International Statistics.￿ Data
were rescaled by the Bureau of labor Statistics (BLS) in order to facilitate
international comparisons. For details see ￿Comparative Civilian Labor Force
Statistics, 10 Countries, 1960-2004￿ .
Tobin￿ s q: Ratio of share price index to the investment de￿ ator, normalized
to be unity on average. Share price index (all shares) is relative to MIB stock
exchange; Investment de￿ ator is simply the de￿ ator for total investment.
In￿ ation expectations-Fisher Equation: Di⁄erence between the nominal rate
on long-term Italian bonds and a measure of the world real interest rate :
￿e = iLT ￿ r￿ (22)
The world real interest rate r￿is computed as the di⁄erence between the
long-term US Treasury bond rate, and a ￿ve-year moving average of American
CPI in￿ ation (OECD data). Italian long-term and short-term quarterly interest
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Expected and actual in￿ ation: PCE (left) and CPI (right) speci￿cation
Method for accounting for supply shocks: Dummy variables or percentage
changes of fuel and food prices, were alternatively used to account for supply
shocks. The choice depends on the speci￿cation. For fuel prices we took the
CPI of fuel, electricity and gasoline; for food prices the CPI for food excluding
restaurants was employed.
￿ CPI speci￿cation:
D69=1 in 1969 Q2 ; zero otherwise
D74 =1 in 1974 Q1; zero otherwise
D75 =1 in 1975 Q1; zero otherwise
D76 =1 in 1976 Q3; zero otherwise
D80=1 in 1980 Q2; ; zero otherwise
￿ GDP De￿ ator speci￿cation
Current and lagged food price index percentage change
Current and lagged fuel price index percentage change
￿ PCE De￿ ator speci￿cation
Current and lagged food price index percentage change
Current and lagged fuel price index percentage change
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